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ABSTRACT 
Both the US & UK government have decided that citizens will to 
authenticate to government using Federated Identity (FedID) 
solutions: governments do not want to be Identity providers 
(IdPs), but leverage accounts that citizens have with other service 
providers instead.  We investigated how citizens react to their first 
encounter FedID authentication in this context. We performed 2 
studies using low fidelity prototypes with: in study 1, 44 citizen 
participants, & in study 2, 22 small business owners, employees 
& agents. We recorded their reactions during their user journey 
authenticating with 3rd party providers they already had accounts 
with.  In study 1, 50% of participants said they would not 
continue to use the system on reaching the hub page, & 45% 
believed they were being asked to make a payment.  25% of those 
continuing said they would stop when they reached the consent 
page, where they were asked by their IdP to authorise the release 
of their identifying information to the government service.  34% 
of the participants felt threatened rather than reassured by the 
privacy protection statement.  With study 2's improved prototype, 
only 14% of participants said they would not continue on 
reaching the hub page, & 6% abandoned at the consent page.  Our 
results show that usability & acceptance of FedID can be greatly 
improved by the application of standard HCI techniques, but trust 
in the ID Provider is essential.  We finally report results from a 
survey of which ID providers UK citizens would trust, & found 
significant differences between age groups. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [Models and principals]: User/Machine Systems - 
Human factors.  
K.4.4 [Computers and society]: Electronic commerce - 
Security 
General Terms 
Design, Experimentation, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Usability; Federated Authentication; Identity Management. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most governments in industrialised nations want to move 
government services online, to offer citizens more convenient 
access, and reduce transaction costs.  Both the UK and US 
governments have decided that those goals are best realised by 
using federated identity to authenticate citizens. This means that – 
rather than receiving a an online government identity – like 
citizens of Italy, Denmark and Estonia do, to name a few 
examples – US and UK citizens will use a Federated Identity 
(FedID) solution to authenticate. Basically, they will  use online 
credentials they hold with certified third party - identity providers 
(IdPs) to access online services offered by relying parties – both 
commercial and Governmental.  Instead of accessing your tax 
records by entering your Government issued username, PIN and 
password, you will access them (for example) by typing your 
online banking credentials into your bank’s website, and be 
transferred to the page for your records at the Government’s Tax 
service.   
In addition to offering lower transaction costs and enhanced 
administrative capabilities (reducing the number of accounts and 
fraud),.FedID is supposed to offer security and convenience to the 
citizen. Eradicating the burden of multiple usernames and 
passwords is a focus of identity management system design [10].  
The burden has been amply documented [e.g. 9], as have users' 
attempts to reduce the burden by using the same usernames and 
passwords across different accounts [6] – a risky practice. By 
enabling existing credentials to be used securely across a larger 
number of systems, federated identity systems impose less burden 
on the citizen to remember credentials that they are likely to use 
infrequently, but that are extremely important – such as tax 
returns. FedID should makes it less effort to access those services 
and less likely citizens find themselves locked out – which can 
lead to significant problems, e.g. when they cannot file their tax 
return on time.  Moreover, security of the credentials is likely to 
be higher in services that citizens use frequently (breaches are 
more likely to be noticed, and sooner).   
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In the UK Identity Assurance (IDA) program, the Government 
has mandated that the system should support the following 
principles (among others) [1]: 
 privacy for citizens when transacting,  
 choice in who provides identity services, and  
 transparency in the transfer and use of personal data.   
These principles are desirable in identity federation system 
design [3], and mean that 3rd parties providing identity services 
for citizens should not know which relying parties they are 
transacting with, and vice versa.  In our example, the bank you 
use at IdP would not know the citizen is transacting with the tax 
authority, who, in turn,  would not know that you’re logging in 
via your bank.  Citizens not comfortable using a particular IdP  
for a particular transaction can choose different IdPs for different 
services: for example, a citizen may choose the bank as IdP for 
some services, and  their webmail provider for others..   
However, all identity management systems require users to 
perform "security actions" (such as presenting a security token, or 
entering a knowledge-based credential) based upon security 
conclusions (e.g. determining the security state of a system from 
observations, such as the presence of closed padlock icons in 
browser chrome) [10].  These indicators harbour usability 
challenges - users have to understand to notice them, understand 
what they mean, and chose the correct action [10].  One example 
in FedID is consent:-users must approve (or reject) the sharing of 
their digital credentials.  In current online transactions, consent is 
obtained rarely according to Friedman’s [8] criteria for informed 
consent.  There are concern that FedID mechanisms could lead to 
unintended disclosure and privacy breaches because users do not 
understand what they are consenting to [5].  Other causes for 
accidental disclosure are that most users – focussed on their 
primary task – are likely to dismiss warnings, and trust what they 
perceive as familiar service providers and technologies [11].  
While some heuristics have been proposed predicting the 
acceptance of national identity management systems [e.g. 13], 
they have not been tested with a variety of populations.  We 
currently have insufficient knowledge to predict if a particular 
national user population will understand how to use FedID in the 
government context, and reject or embrace it. .  The only widely 
successful FedID solution to date is FaceBook Connect [cf. 6], 
which is promoted to users as a convenience, and not designed to 
protect their privacy – arguably, its intention is exactly the 
opposite. In this paper we describe three studies that were carried 
out with representatives of the intended user population on 
prototype designs of the UK FedID solution. 
Studies 1 and 2 were think-aloud laboratory usability tests of 
low-fidelity prototypes, with different user journeys and different 
groups of users. Study 3 was an online survey on acceptability of 
different types of IdPs. We first describe the method and results 
of each of the studies, discuss what they mean for answering the 
question posed in the title, and present our conclusion of what 
needs to be done to make FedID work in the government context. 
2. STUDY 1: NHS USER JOURNEY 
In Study 1 we tested two ‘low fidelity’ prototypes to illustrate 
a National Health Service (NHS) user journey, where participants 
are asked to imagine they are logging in through a Post Office 
account (IdP) in order to make an NHS appointment for their 
hospital test results. Prototype NHS 1 had a plain hub page. 
Prototype NHS 2 had a hub page with trust seals, social 
networking links and contact links and information. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
We recruited 44 particpants, who are UK resident and 
regularly transact online., All had accounts with one or more of 
the IdPs featured in the prototype: Post Office, VISA, Experian, 
OpenID, GBGroup, or PayPal.  The participants were recruited in 
three age groups, 22 were below 30 (average age 24), 10 were in 
their thirties (average age 32), and 12 were over-forties (average 
age 51).  . 
2.1.2. Prototypes 
The prototypes complied with the design principles published 
by the UK Government’s IDA Program.  Each screen of the 
prototypes had only one working link, so there was only one route 
through the pages.  The journeys start at the Service Provider 
(NHS) home page (see Figure 1).  
Next the user goes to a hub page where they choose a 3rd 
party IdP – ideally one they already have an account with (see 
Figure 2).  The user is then directed to the IdP’s login page (see 
Figure 3) where they log in using their normal credentials.  On the 
next screen they give consent for the transfer of their identifying 
information (see Figure 4) and then arrive back at the NHS pages 
(see Figure 5), to complete the task they had been set (see next 
section).  
2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants viewed only one prototype (Prototype NHS 1 or 
2), assigned at random, and were asked to role-play a person who 
wanted to book an appointment to get their hospital test results, 
and that this person had an online account with the Post Office. 
The experimenter sat next to the participant, and asked the 
participant questions about each page that they saw, including 
“What would you click on next?”.  Each prototype page had only 
one link implemented – to the next page in the user-journey.  
Participants were directed to the one working link if they chose 
anything else, and so progressed through all the screens.  After the 
final screen, participants were questioned further about their 
experiences, and then debriefed. All participants received a £15 
Amazon voucher for taking part. 
Participants’ responses were noted by the experimenter during 
testing sessions (as close to verbatim as possible). The statements 
were analysed using Thematic Analysis [2] collaboratively by two 
researchers:  Each statement was read by both researchers, who 
discussed what theme it represented until consensus was reached. 
Statements that the researchers could not agree upon or where no 
clear theme emerged were labelled ‘Miscellaneous’.  The 
resulting codes are summarised in Figure 7. 
2.2. Results 
Figure 6 shows participant continuation and drop-out rates for 
both NHS1 & 2 prototypes combined, and we interpret it as 
showing where the pain-points for our participants.. Five 
participants said they wouldn’t continue on the first page of the 
prototype, because they prefer to transact by phone instead of 
online. 19/32 the participants viewing the hub page said they 
would stop there, and go to a different channel to complete their 
transaction.  4/15 of those reaching the page where they consent 
to or decline the IdP passing validated identifying information 
about them to the IDA system – said they would not consent and 
would stop there.  Of 44 participants starting the experiment, only 
11 said they would continue through the IDA user journey to a 
page where they returned to the service provider and could carry 
out their transaction.   
 
 Figure 1: NHS Journey – Relying party ‘home page 
 
Figure 2: NHS Journey – hub page v2 
 
Figure 3: NHS Journey – Identity Provider Login 
 
Figure 4: NHS Journey – Identity Provider Consent 
 
Figure 5: NHS Journey – Relying Party “landing”  
 
 
Figure 6: Participant continuation and drop out, for both 
user journeys NHS1 & NHS2 combined 
Our analysis of participants’ statements identified some 
positive perceptions.  More than half (56%) of participants Got 
the concept of FedID, saying it was about using credentials from 
one system on another, and identified some of the benefits this 
could confer. 
“This is simple and will save me time” 
“I have an account with one of them so I’ll use it” 
 
 Figure 7: Analysis of participants statements for both user 
journeys NHS1 & NHS2 combined. 
 
17% of participants Understood the process, correctly 
interpreting what was happening on each screen.  12% Got the 
design , identifying the different parties involved in the process.  
  49% participant statements revealed usability issues  Of these 
the largest proportion were for improved Interaction design (48% 
of Holistic design issues), improving Unpredictability of the 
interaction sequence and Lack of coherence in the user journey, 
and remedying the problem on the first step of the users’ journey - 
the Service Provider’s home page - where there being No clear 
call-to-action  meant that people didn’t know where to click or 
what to do to start the journey. 
The next largest proportion of usability issues (38%) were lost 
opportunities for delivering Reassurance to users about IDA as a 
concept and as artefacts they were interacting with.  These fell 
into three types: Internal (design) reassurance – page elements 
that would deliver perceptions that the system was secure and 
protected the user’s personal data – a common example being no 
lock icons; External reassurance delivered to users before their 
first interaction with the system was also called for (e.g. large 
publicity campaigns), so that users could come to the system cued 
to understand it and trust it; and the particular need to Convey the 
benefits of using FedID, that were not apparent to many 
participants.  Example statements: 
“Complicated – I’m lost – where is this going?” 
“I’d expect logo showing security like padlocks” 
20% of participants expressed Concerns: Nearly half (46%) of 
those worried This is a scam! – the participants did not believe 
these were bona-fide government backed projects, but were 
instead conceived of and implemented by criminals attempting to 
steal their credentials and commit fraud..  These statements were 
made by 12/44 participants. 21% expressed Financial concerns – 
a perception that the system would be asking them to pay for 
services that they usually accessed for free.  13% expressed a 
Need for accountability  – that they wanted help or redress if the 
system caused them difficulty or harm, which was related to their 
Privacy and Security concerns (10% and 8% respectively) – 
would their personal data including login credentials and sensitive 
records be kept inviolate. 1 participant mentioned a Lack of 
transparency - what would happen to a user’s personal data, and 
the relationships between the counterparties: 
“This is a scam – I’d shut it down now!” 
“Who is responsible for this is it goes wrong?” 
When asked if using the system would enable the Post Office 
(the IdP in this user journey) to check their medical records at the 
NHS (the Service Provider) to price their travel insurance, 20% 
(8/44) said yes.   
As Figure 6 shows, the concerns clustered around the hub 
page, and the IdP’s consent page.  Particular issues with the latter 
appeared to be that participants either did not understand the 
system's privacy and consent model, and believed that it granted 
powers to release their data to unknown data processors (leaving 
themselves with no effective control over their personal data), or 
they believed that the consent screen was requesting they enter 
personal data that the website did not already hold, and 
interpreted this as a phishing attack. 
The penultimate class of statements were about Breaking the 
user’s mental model (8%), where participants either Don’t get the 
concept – not understanding at all what was happening after 
interacting with the prototype screens, or it Breaks the mental 
model – they do not believe that the transaction parties in IDA 
have a working relationship: . 
“PayPal have nothing to do with the NHS” 
The final group of statements revealed valid rejections of the 
system based on enough understanding of it to have an informed 
view.  These Attitudinal problems were comprised of 
Compartmentalisation – that the counterparties in IDA should not 
have a working relationship, and Internet refuseniks – people who 
believed that some transactions should not be “digital by default”:   
 “Keep government and finance separate” 
“I’ll only deal with the NHS - directly” 
3. STUDY 2: HMRC USER JOURNEY 
In Study 2 the high level goal of the user journey was identical 
to Study 1 – logging in through a third party to access a 
government service, consenting to the transfer of your identifying 
information along the way. However the low level details of the 
scenario differed in terms of the data subject in the transaction, 
and which Government Service was being accessed through 
which third party.  Participants role-played a small company’s 
Director, and were transacting with information about the 
business; they had to transact with the UK tax office (Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs - HMRC) about the business’ 
employees, by using a credential belonging to the business.  In the 
scenario, Santander issued this credential to the business for 
online banking.   
Lessons learned from testing the NHS1 & 2 prototypes were 
used to create a revised user journey in prototypes HMRC1 & 2.   
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 22 Small to Medium Enterprise (SME) 
business people, who regularly transact with HMRC through its 
website, authenticating with the "Government Gateway" (a 
password based authentication service administered by the UK 
Government that IDA is intended to replace).  Average age was 
49 (min. 36, max. 68 years old, s.d. 9.7 years), with 15 male 
participants and 7 female.  Ten (10) were company directors (of 
businesses with an average of 3 employees), 3 were financial 
controllers within their business and 9 were accountants or people 
who do book keeping on behalf of several small businesses. 
3.1.2. Prototypes 
Two HMRC user journey prototypes were constructed, each 
having three screens in addition to the NHS prototypes'.  Figures 
8 to 13 show the screens from the prototype HMRC 2.   
Positive 
outcomes 
Usability 
problems 
Concerns 
Unclear user 
model 
Attitudinal 
problems 
 Figure 8: HMRC Journey – relying party home page 
 
Figure 9: HMRC Journey – IDA preview page 
 
Figure 10: HMRC Journey – hub page 
 
Figure 11: HMRC Journey – IdP login page 
 
Figure 12: HMRC Journey – IdP consent page 
 
Figure 13: HMRC Journey – hub login status page 
The two HMRC prototypes were identical in function, but 
differed in some user-interface details.  For space reasons we give 
screenshots for HMRC 2 only, and describe differences between 
it and HMRC 1. 
 HMRC 2’s home page (Figure 8) contains an explicit link 
to the hub page that HMRC 1’s omitted. 
 HMRC2 has a step-by-step overview of the process in its 
IDA preview page (Figure 9), rather than HMRC 1’s 
generic statement about the security of IDA.  
  
 HMRC 2’s Hub screen (Figure 10) and IdP’s Consent 
screen (Figure 12) used a drag and drop interaction, 
whereas HMRC 1 (not displayed) used a click-based 
interaction style in its equivalent screens. 
 HMRC 2 has a progress bar across the top of its windows 
(in contrast to HMRC1 which omits it – see Figs 10-13) 
3.1.3. Procedure 
The HMRC prototypes were tested with a procedure that was 
very similar to the procedure used for testing the NHS prototypes.  
Participants role-played a user of the system with a particular 
goal, and answered the experimenter’s questions about each page 
of the prototype.  All participants were debriefed and received a 
£15 Amazon voucher. 
3.2. Results 
Prototypes HMRC1 & 2 showed substantially better retention 
of users than Prototypes NHS1 & 2 prototypes (Figure 14).  Only 
19% of HMRC 1 & 2 participants said they would stop by the 
time they reach the hub page, compared to 51% with the previous 
prototypes – a statistically significant difference (Fisher’s exact 
test, p=0.006).  Moreover, only 6% of those reaching the IdP’s 
consent page with the new prototypes said they would stop, 
compared to 27% with the previous prototypes.  No statistically 
significant difference was detected (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.172).  
Power analysis shows that a true effect of this size would require 
a sample size of 52 per group to have an 80% chance of being 
detected as statistically significant.  Overall, 68% of participants 
who started the user journey with the new prototypes said that 
they would continue through to the destination screen, compared 
to 25% with the previous prototypes, a difference that is 
statistically significant (Z=3.63, p<0.0001). 
 
 
Figure 14: Participant continuation and drop out, for both 
user journeys HMRC1 & HMRC2 combined 
3.3. Study 3: Online survey  
A central premise of (and FedID in general) is that citizens 
should be able to (re-) use existing credentials that they hold with 
existing businesses in order to access Government services.  The 
core of this survey was to assess if the target users willingness to 
90 questions that enquired which Government services 
respondents would or would not access using their use existing 
credentials / accounts that they hold from for access to e-
government services, and if so, which IdPs they would find 
acceptable, we designed and administered a range of business 
types survey..   
3.3.1. Respondents 
104 UK residents were recruited through a UCL psychology 
department’s participant recruitment list..  Average age of 
respondents was 32.3 (SD = 14.3, min=18, max= 73). 38 declared 
their gender as female, 21 as male, and 19 did not declare it.  In 
terms of income only 3 respondents declared they were receiving 
state benefit payments, 66 declared that they were not, and 34 did 
not answer. 27 respondent declared that their highest qualification 
was a Higher Degree, 20 that that it was a Degree, and 22 that it 
was an A-level (e.g. university entrance exam).  The majority of 
respondents (64) held online accounts offering federated identity 
services that could be used to log into relying parties (e.g. at least 
one of Facebook, Google, Windows Live, Yahoo, Blogger, 
Twitter, LinkedIn or WordPress), however, far fewer – only 20 – 
reported accessing relying party sites with them.   
Each respondent could answer one of four questionnaires – see 
section 2.3.2 for more details.  In the first round of recruitment 43 
respondents started a questionnaire and 28 completed one.  A 
second recruitment resulted in 60 more respondents beginning a 
questionnaire, and 47 completing one.  In total 75 questionnaires 
were returned in full, made up of 21 for questionnaire A, 18 for B, 
19 for C, and 17 for D. 
3.3.2. Survey 
Our survey was implemented using the open-source survey 
engine LimeSurvey 1.91.  In order to reduce the time required to 
complete the survey the 22 business types were split between four 
questionnaires as follows. 
 
Questionnaire A:  
 Your bank for personal banking 
 Credit Reference Agency 
 The Post Office 
 Payment Card Service 
 Online Payments 
 Your bank for a business account 
Questionnaire B:   
 Webmail, Calendar, IM, and related accounts (Google, 
Windows Live, Apple ID, Yahoo!, etc.) 
 Online Marketplace (eBay, Gumtree, Loot, Craigslist, 
etc.) 
 Social Network Provider (Facebook, Twitter, Google+) 
 Online Retailer (Amazon, Argos, Play.com, etc.) 
 Your supermarket (Asda, Lidl, Morrisons, Sainsburys, 
Tesco, etc.) 
 Your insurance company (for Home, Contents, Car, 
Travel, Life, etc.) 
Questionnaire C:  
 TV supplier (Sky, Virgin, etc.) 
 Telecoms / broadband supplier (BT, Vodaphone, O2, etc.) 
 Triple-play supplier – phone, mobile, TV (Virgin, Sky, 
BT, etc.) 
 Your employer 
 Online dating site (Match.com, Guardian Soulmates) 
 Utility supplier (British Gas, Npower, Thames Water, 
etc.) 
Questionnaire D: 
 Travel ticket company (Great Western Trains, 
thetrainline.com, expedia.co.uk, Easyjet.com) 
 A computer account from your old university, or other 
education institution 
 Private healthcare provider 
 Transport For London (e.g. Oyster card, bike rental) 
 Sports related website (fan site, gym site, club site, etc.) 
Every questionnaire covered the same range of Government 
services: 
 Electoral Register 
 Passport 
 Council tax 
 TV Licence 
 HM Revenue and Customs, on your own behalf 
 HM Revenue and Customs, on behalf of a business 
 Benefits 
 The NHS 
 Driving Licence 
 Fishing Rod Licencing. 
 
In order to improve validity and to further reduce the time 
taken to complete the questionnaires, the questionnaires asked 
each respondent which of the business and Government services 
they currently or previously had relationships with, and only 
displayed questions about those combinations. 
We also examined respondents’ prioritised requirements for a 
national FedID system in this survey, with two questions.   
The first question was open ended and asked,  
“Please tell us which two or three things you 
consider to be the most important when accessing 
Government online services.”  
The second question was closed response, and asked, 
“Please could you rank the following requirements 
according to how important you consider them to 
be in a system you would use to access 
Government online services with.” 
The ranked items are shown in Figure 18. 
3.3.3. Procedure 
Two rounds of recruitment were undertaken, by the 
Psychology mailing list with a link to a page that redirected 
respondents to one of the four questionnaires.   
The first recruitment redirected respondents at random to one 
of the four questionnaires.  This resulted in an uneven distribution 
of completed questionnaires between the four versions, so a 
second recruitment was undertaken. 
The second recruitment redirected respondents in sequence to 
guarantee a more equitable distribution: the first respondent 
clicking a link was directed to Questionnaire A, the second to 
Questionnaire B, and so on with the fifth respondent directed to 
questionnaire A again, etc.  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. The market for  
3.4.2. FedID access to e-government 
The UK Identity Assurance Programme specifies that there 
should be no privacy implications of using any certified FedID 
provider to access any e-government services– any combination 
of IdP and relying parties (RPs) should protect the privacy of the 
citizen using it : with no RPs (e-government services) should not 
know who your IdP is, and vice versa.  One would expect 
therefore that all the IdPs should be equally and fully acceptable 
to citizens.  However, they are not: 44% of ratings over all were 
that respondents Would Not Use an IdP to access a Service 
Provider, with a further 42% being Undecided.   
Figure 15 shows a summary of participants’ willingness to use 
their business relationships for IDA, summarised by business 
type.   
What is striking is the large variation in the proportion of 
Would Use and Would Not Use ratings – our respondents 
expressed strong preferences and dislikes for different types of 
IdPs.  The Post Office was given the largest proportion of Would 
Use  ratings – 70%- whereas utility companies were given 4% - 
the least.   
Respondents were more positive towards they idea of 
‘everyday businesses’ (such as webmail providers, supermarkets, 
banks, online retailers) as IdPs than we had expected. They were 
also positive towards their employers acting as their IdPs. 
Businesses that received negative ratings were Online Social 
Networks (OSN) – Credit Reference Agencies (CRAs), Internet 
Service Providers (ISP) and phone companies, and utilities.  
The significant difference between businesses that offer 
communication services was surprising: Webmail, Calendar, IM, 
and related accounts (Google, Windows Live, Apple ID, Yahoo!, 
etc.) received more ‘would use as IdP’ votes than OSNs 
(Facebook, Twitter, Google+)” (Z = -3.43, p= 0.001).  Comments 
indicate that that respondents seemed to be wary of the 
broadcasting nature of OSNs:  
“Worried that my hospital details would be 
broadcast on Facebook if I pressed the wrong 
button”. 
  
Figure 15: Respondents’ self-predicted use of Identity 
Providers for IDA 
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There are some positive outcomes for IDA from this data.  
While there are an average of 44% of Would Not Use bars, Would 
Use bars are present too – our sample’s average was 14% of 
ratings being affirmative (see the leftmost bars in Figures 15 & 
16).  These respondents said that they would use their 
relationships with a wide range of business types in order to 
access e-government services.  This supports the mission of the 
UK IDA programme, since some citizens would immediately be 
willing to use some of their existing online credentials to access e-
government.  If these results are representative of the national 
picture, a large number of those UK citizens who are educated 
and used to transacting online would make the transition easily.  
However, this may only be a small proportion of citizens overall.   
 
Figure 16: Respondents’ self-predicted use of IDA with 
Relying Parties 
Figure 16 shows a summary for each Government Service we 
studied across all business types.  There were many negative 
responses: an average of 44% said they would not use their 
existing online credentials to authenticate to access e-government 
services.  Taking Figures 15 and 16 together, we see that 
respondents have preferences about which IdPs they would use 
and - crucially would not use - to access Government services, 
and which Government services they would access through IDA.  
More accurate determination of what these preferences are, and in 
what proportions will require follow up work. 
This result may be seen as consistent with Roger’s technology 
adoption lifecycle [cf. 17], and a normal response to new 
technologies being applied in established transaction contexts.  
Roger’s technology adoption lifecycle describes the diffusion of 
new technologies through populations, where adoption follows 
the same pattern irrespective of the technology (although adoption 
may stall, depending on aspects of the technology such as its 
usability).  In this model new technology is first taken up by a 
small number of risk-oriented and wealthy “innovators” before 
spreading through other larger, more risk-averse and less 
financially secure segments of the population.   
Our data tends to support this – Figures 15 and 16 also display 
many Undecided bars: respondents who did not actively feel they 
would or would not use businesses as IdPs – with an average of 
42% of all ratings.  For half of the Government Services we asked 
about, more participants said they were undecided about using 
businesses as IdPs, than said they would NOT use them for this 
purpose.  So currently, it the largest group of citizens are neither 
for nor against FedID solutions for e-government – their attitude 
is ‘wait and see’.    
3.4.3. Citizens requirements of an IDA system 
Our survey also attempted to elicit citizen requirements for an 
e-government IDA system, and in two ways – by giving them a 
free response question (Figure 17), and giving them a list of 
hypothesised benefits to rank (Figure 18).  
  
 
Figure 17: Three most important requirements for IDA 
systems; open question responses.  Requirements in different 
brackets had statistically significantly different proportions of 
respondents ranking them as most important, at p > .05 
Figure 17 shows the benefits that respondents volunteered as 
those they would wish for from an Identity Assurance system, 
collected into themes.  The chart shows a count of how many 
times items of each theme were stated as being most important, 
2nd or 3rd most important, etc., and is sorted by frequency of being 
mentioned as most important.  
Secure / Safe was the requirement most frequently expressed 
by respondents as most important, using phrases such as,  
 Security (19 people) 
 Safe and Secure (2 people) and Safety (2 more) 
However, it was not statistically significantly more often cited 
as the most important than the next most frequently cited theme - 
Ease of use (Z=0.77, p = 0.44).  The proportion of times Ease of 
Use was listed as second most important greatly exceeds that of 
any other theme, and boosts its overall proportion of mentions to 
significantly more than any other theme’s, including Secure / Safe 
(Z = -3.17, p = 0.002).  This highlight’s the critical importance of 
usability in any national e-ID scheme.   
Phrases used for requirements of this type included, 
 User friendly (6 respondents) 
 Ease of use (10 respondents) 
 Ease of navigation (7 respondents) 
 Clarity of information (7 respondents) 
The next group of requirements were significantly less 
frequently mentioned as most important than Ease of use (Z=-
1.97, p=0.048), but at an equivalent level to each other.  These 
included Convenience, with items such as: 
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 Ease of access (5 respondents) 
 Easy access (4 respondents) 
Also Privacy/ Confidentiality, with items such as: 
 Privacy (6 respondents) 
 Confidentiality (6 respondents) 
Up-to-date / Informative / Helpful, relates to the quality of 
services available by using the FedID, with items such as: 
 Has information relevant to me (4 respondents) 
 Up-to-date information (3 respondents) 
 Regularly updated content (1 respondent) 
Up-to-date/Informative is significantly more highly rated than 
the next most highly rated theme – Fast (Z=-2.39, p=0.017), 
which in turn is statistically not significantly different to the 
themes that follow it.   
Of the IDA benefits suggested to respondents (see Figure 18), 
the most highly ranked benefit was Increased security.  The next 
most highly ranked was Saves you time.  These are not 
statistically significantly different to each other (Z = 1.71  p = 
0.086).  Increased Security was however statistically significantly 
more popular than Reduced bureaucracy (Z = 3.59  p< 0.0001) – 
the third most highly ranked possible benefit. 
Saves you time is almost statistically significantly more valued 
than Reduced bureaucracy (Z = 1.85  p= 0.064), and definitely is 
more popular than all the lesser valued benefits (Z = 2.09  p= 
0.036).  Reduced bureaucracy and Reduced costs to taxpayers are 
as highly valued as each other, and statistically significantly more 
valued than the remaining benefits. 
While a few respondents (less than 10%) valued Increased 
opportunities for UK businesses the most of the possible benefits, 
nearly 40% valued this less than all other benefits.  Similarly 
Fewer passwords to remember, You will remember your login 
details more and Avoiding signing up for new credentials were 
not as important to respondents as other benefits. 
 
Figure 18: Respondents’ rankings of Government 
generated IDA system requirements, from 1 (most important) 
to 8 (least important).  Requirements in different brackets 
had statistically significantly different proportions of 
respondents ranking them as most important, at p > .05 
4. DISCUSSION 
In our survey, both ways of measuring what respondents value 
in FedId for access to e-government services (e.g. the ranking 
exercise and the open question) bring out the importance of 
security and safety.  It was the theme most frequently mentioned 
as being most important.  Privacy and confidentiality are 
something that respondents value – approximately as much as 
Convenience – that the system should be ‘easy to access’.  Ease of 
Use as a concept also ranks highly in the open question section.  
In this sample at least, the number of times it was mentioned as 
most important is not significantly different to Secure/Safe, but it 
is more frequently mentioned overall, and is the most frequently 
mentioned theme.  Reduced bureaucracy and Reduced cost to 
taxpayers were not mentioned unprompted - but when suggested 
to them in the ranking exercise they were ranked important 
relative to other requirements.  This suggests that there is scope 
for improving citizen awareness of these benefits when marketing 
FedID and e-government. Speed and the related time saving are 
important in both open questions and the ranking exercise. 
Transparency does appear in responses to the open question , but 
ranks low overall.   
As in previous research with UK citizens [4], our respondents 
wanted assurance that transition to online does not equal ‘you’re 
on your own’  that there should be easy to get human assistance 
when needed, and  redress and restitution if something went 
wrong.. 
Webmail providers (such as Google and Yahoo) were 
relatively popular as possible IdPs – especially younger 
respondents said they would use them to access e-government 
services. This concurs with work that found increasing privacy 
concerns about internet with age, with nearly double the 
respondents aged 40+ having concerns compared to those aged 20 
or less [12].  In contrast, OSNs (such as FaceBook and Google+) 
were relatively unpopular as IdPs – far more people were not 
willing to access Government service through them.  This is a key 
finding in view of the success of  – FaceBook Connect – the 600 
pound Gorilla in the space FedID. It suggests that people are 
aware of the privacy implications (and the UK government has 
ruled out FaceBook as an IdP, on those grounds) but the 
comments also show that – similar to Riegelsberger’s results in 
the early days of e-commerce [14] they do not feel entirely 
competent in this new space, and fear that they might broadcast 
confidential information by mistake.  
Online payments businesses (e.g. PayPal) were also relatively 
unpopular as IdPs - very few respondents were willing to access 
e-government services through them, and more than half said no.  
Credit Reference Agencies were also not popular, Whilst our 
sample size was small, it suggests that work that awareness of the 
benefits of using financial sector providers as IdPs needs 
boosting... 
4.1. CONCLUSIONS  
4.1.1. Improving acceptability of FedID for e-
government 
Our studies asked participants to look at prototype user 
journeys.  On each screen they were asked would they continue or 
stop.  Drop-out rates in the first prototype study were – especially 
given the level technology-literacy of our participants – alarming.  
The fact that changes to the prototype for the second study led to 
a lower drop-out rate shows that usability design needs to be part 
of the rescue plan, but there was still a significant drop-out rate 
that shows there needs to be more preparatory communication –
FAQs and hands-on demos with people on hand to answer 
citizens’ questions.. 
4.1.2. Improve communication about privacy features  
To protect citizens’ privacy, the UK FedID system 
specification prevents RPs and IdPs from communicating directly, 
and even knowing who their transaction parties are.  Our findings 
show that the benefit of this approach is not obvious – and even 
worse, our participants inferred the system was NOT secure – 
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which is their top requirement.  Current mental models of trust 
rely on knowing the transaction partner [15], and this means that 
to the citizen at least, the recipient of their citizens personal data 
must be identified.  That, of course, would undermine the privacy 
protection the system was designed to offer.  This is a 
fundamental conundrum that needs to be addressed, urgently. 
4.1.3. Citizens requirements for National FedID 
There appear to be three core benefits that respondents desire 
from National Federated e-ID systems.   
(a) Respondents rated Security as the most important benefit. 
(b) Ease of use and saves you time are key properties that 
respondents also valued. 
(c) Reduced cost to taxpayers and Reduced bureaucracy were 
also highly valued.  
4.1.4. Some IdPs more acceptable than others  
Some transactions between citizens and Government will 
require more rigorous protection than others, and this has been 
codified into 4 levels of assurance, with higher levels requiring 
more elaborate, effortful and certain proofs of identity.  The IdA 
system design presented to participants in our prototypes made no 
reference to these levels of assurance; all IdPs presented to 
participants were not differentiated according to the types of 
transactions they were able to protect.  Moreover, neither did we 
mention levels of assurance when we questioned participants 
about which possible IdPs they might use for which Government 
services. We had assumed that all IdPs would be able to offer 
services that protected citizens’ privacy equally whatever their 
transactions with whichever relying party.  However, respondents 
still appeared to have preferences over which kind of business 
they would be willing to use to gain access to e-government 
services. 
We asked survey respondents which of a range of business 
types they would be willing or not willing to use as their Identity 
Provider (IdP) to access a range of government services in a 
Federated National e-ID system.  In general, more respondents 
were definitely not willing to use each kind of business as an IdP 
than were definitely willing to use it – in a ratio of about 3:1. 
However, for about half the government services we asked 
about, more respondents had no strong feelings about using their 
relationships with businesses for IdA than said they definitely did 
not want to use these relationships for IdA.  About twice as many 
said they had no strong feelings than said they definitely would 
use their existing accounts for IdA. 
Extrapolating from this data, it is plausible that many citizens 
could to persuaded to use FedID for transactions with e-
government, provided their requirement – with security, ease of 
access and .  Each Government service in the survey had at least 
one business type that some participants would be willing to use 
as an IdP to access it with, so the IDAP focus of delivering IdP 
choice for the citizen is supported by this data.   
4.1.5. More than a ‘user interface’ problem 
Our studies show that conventional usability techniques can do 
much to improve the understanding and acceptability of FedID for 
e-government transactions,.  However, there are things to be done 
beyond the interface: participants were distrustful of a system that 
disrupted their expectations by establishing relationships between 
organisations that they believed did not and should not be 
involved in their relationship with government, and that - while 
risks of such a system were apparent to them - the benefits were 
not.  Citizens need to be better  - but honestly - informed about 
the risks and benefits of authenticating to government in this way, 
and government needs to provide accessible support in case of 
problems, and effective redress and restitution if anything goes 
wrong. 
4.2. Further research 
The participants in our second prototype testing study had all 
experienced the UK’s Government Gateway – an authentication 
system that has received criticism for the burdens placed upon it’s 
users, and that IDA is meant to replace.  This experience could 
have given our revised prototypes a greater perception of usability 
and acceptability, compared to how they might be perceived by 
users without that experience.  We did not know if participants in 
our first prototype study had used the Government Gateway or 
not.  We therefor recommend that further work should sample 
participants from populations that come to transact with the 
Government online for the first time, as well as populations that 
have used the Government Gateway, to see how it influences 
people’s reactions to IDA. 
The Identity Provider’s Consent screen was redesigned from 
the first prototype study to the second study, naming the known 
intermediate recipient of the users’ identifying data (rather than 
saying only that the final recipient was unknown) and introducing 
a direct manipulation interaction style where the user dragged 
their personal data and dropped it onto the named recipient.  This 
redesigned Consent screen was an improvement.  Conventional 
user interfaces for giving consent include tick boxes or OK 
buttons, and are very accessible to people who have disabilities of 
various kinds.  They suffer from the disadvantage of being easily 
dismissed by users who instinctively act upon perceiving an alert 
without taking in what they are consenting to.  Direct 
manipulation interfaces in contrast do have accessibility 
problems, for example where visually impaired users may not be 
able to see the icons to drag and drop them.  However, they may 
require users to pay more attention to the consent choice they are 
making, by forcing users to manipulate their personal data 
directly and attend to the destination they are sending it to. 
Further work should therefore explore if positively identifying the 
recipient of users’ identifying data (even if the recipient is an 
intermediary and not the final recipient) using conventional 
mechanisms such as tick boxes is enough in a consent screen, or if 
direct manipulation interfaces confer substantial advantages by 
increasing user attention and comprehension.   
Finally, the data we present on citizens preferences for IDA 
system benefits and which businesses they would use or not use 
as IdPs is based on a small and nationally unrepresentative 
sample.  We recommend that these issues be explored with far 
larger surveys with representative samples of respondents, and 
enough respondents to give good precision. 
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